Venture Studio Architect - I help you design, launch, and grow your company creation studio.

Most innovation programs fail not because of lack of ideas, but because they lack a system for venture creation.

I help innovation leaders in corporations, universities, and economic development organizations build venture studios that scale and deliver. Backed by data, frameworks, and insights from studying over 500 venture studios globally.

As Senior Director of Research & Data at the Venture Studio Forum, I'm building the empirical backbone of the venture studio asset class. VSF is a 501(c)(6) trade association representing 1,500+ members who have built 650+ companies, 11 unicorns, and $48 billion in enterprise value.

My work establishes venture studios as a formal asset class through:

-Asset Class Analysis in partnership with MIT and Harvard, delivering the first institutionally credible research for LPs and institutional investors
-The Venture Studio Index (VSI) — the first open standard and formal definition for venture studios
-Studio Data Platform (2026) providing structured datasets and benchmarks for researchers and operators
-State of the Studio Report (2026) tracking trends, performance, and sector segmentation
-Policy recommendations for state and federal innovation agencies

Concurrently, as Partner and Head of Insights at 9point8 Collective, I translate this research into practice. We've designed and launched 25+ venture studios. Our approach builds clarity, alignment, and momentum at the intersection of innovation, capital, and impact.

I've spent 20+ years at the intersection of innovation, strategy, and venture building. I launched NCR's first internal accelerator (generating $90M from its first cohort), secured 27+ patents across AI and fintech, and developed investment frameworks that institutional investors now use to allocate capital into the studio model.

Speaking & Workshops: I deliver keynotes and workshops on designing high-performing venture studios, the future of venture creation ecosystems, and turning knowledge engines into commercial engines.

🎤 Book me to speak: VentureStudioForum.org/speaking
 📊 Learn from our research: newsletter.venturestudioforum.org
 🌍 Join the community: venturestudioforum.org
 💼 Work with us: 9point8collective.com

Matthew Burris

Venture Studios have a 100x advantage over accelerators and venture funds.

Studios vs. accelerators vs. VC vs. incubators

One of the simplest ways to compare them? Hands-on support.

Venture capital: maybe 30 minutes per week.

Accelerators: 1–2 hours a week. Mostly group sessions and some limited 1:1.

Incubators: slightly less. Some education, co-working space, network access. But very little operational involvement.

Venture studio: 20 to 100+ hours a week of hands-on execution.
Real operators. Half a person to an entire team building the business with you.

The range of support isn't even close.

P.S. Follow for more venture studio insights

I help innovation leaders build venture studios | Senior Director, Research & Data @ Venture Studio Forum | Partner, Head of Insights @ 9point8 Collective | Keynote Speaker | Trusted by 500+ Studios

Model Comparison.pdf

Venture studios aren’t VC

So why should we try to fit them inside VC frameworks?

The carousel below explains why this is the case (and breaks down an alternative model for venture studios instead).

For more on studio structures, capital efficiency, and the case for new frameworks for venture studios… 

DM/Comment “VSF” to join the venture studio forum (a community for the venture studio ecosystem)

Venture Studios Aren’t  VC Funds.pdf

Corporate Venture Studios are surprisingly common in major corporations. 

Around a third of corporations with Corporate Venture Capital also have a Venture Studio.

Both serve different purposes, and they're distinct operationally, strategically, and financially.

Corporate VC is about gaining strategic access to an external startup, one that the corporation might one day acquire, partner with, or monitor closely.

A Venture Studio works differently, Instead of buying in, you’re building from the ground up.

Usually in a category where the corporation already has deep industry knowledge.

Two powerful tools, but useful for very different parts of the corporate growth strategy.

For more in depth comparison, check the carousel below

P.S. Follow for more venture studio insights

CVS vs. CVC.pdf

Venture capital lives and dies on terminal exits.

But venture studios operate on a differently; they design for liquidity from day one.

The difference starts with ownership.

Traditional VCs typically land at ~10% in early rounds.

Studios, by contrast, start with 25–50%. Even after dilution:

→ +20% post-seed  
→ +15% post-A  
→ +10% post-B  

That creates something rare in early-stage investing: flexibility.

And because of that, secondary sales become not only possible, but repeatable enough to build a strategy around.

Studios can return capital without waiting for IPOs or full acquisitions. 

Cash comes in early. 

LPs see distributions long before the 10-year mark. 

And the studio keeps real upside.

That’s one path.

Other studios build for profitability, creating companies that return cash long before they're sold.

When portcos generate cash, studios don't need to sell to make money. 

Regular distributions fund ongoing operations and accelerate IRR, without new investor capital.

Still others build intentionally for PE acquisition or strategic M&A.

→ PE? Studios partner early with relevant firms, optimizing financials, tooling, and reporting.  


→ M&A? They loop in the right acquirers as advisors or customers before a single line of code is written.

Each strategy gives studios a unique kind of control: over when and how returns happen.

And studios don't have to choose one model.

They can layer them.

Secondary sales + distributions + acquisition prep = cash sooner, smoother J-curve, more resilient portfolios in down markets.

P.S. Follow for more venture studio break downs

The Power of Liquidity Control.pdf

Emerging venture studios often struggle to get off the ground.

And the reason for that is because they never solved the fundamental question:

Who are they really building for?

Venture studios have 4 “customers”:

→ Investors
→ Founders
→ Internal team
→ Follow-on capital

And optimizing for one can break another.

A studio that maximizes investor money without thinking through operating needs often ends up overbuilt and unfocused.

A studio that designs everything for founders may land early talent but struggle to raise sustainable capital.

A studio that assumes follow-on VCs will just show up rarely survives past Fund I.

And the studios that work, start with alignment.

They know what kind of investor they want (and what kind they don’t).

They design an operating model that delivers real support, without getting in the way.

They define what types of entrepreneurs they’re built to serve and what types they should avoid.

And they’re clear-eyed about the follow-on capital they’re targeting, so they can reverse engineer the conditions for it to show up.

Lastly: 

For investors evaluating studios, those 4 customers are a simple lens that cuts through the pitch decks.

→ Does the model make sense for the capital, the people, and the downstream funding?
→ Or is someone subsidizing someone else?

Too many firms focus on perfecting one relationship.

The best ones get the balance right.

Practical Applications for Studio Design and Due Diligence.pdf

6 Common venture studio design mistakes

1. Incorporating Fund Too Soon
2. Picking the Wrong Follow-on Capital
3. Picking the Wrong Founder Archetype
4. Raising Capital Too Early
5. Designing Something Too Fancy
6. Pitching the Model Instead of Yourself

For more in depth breakdown, check the carousel below

The more focused you are early, the better your odds.

P.S. Follow for more venture studio insights

6 Common Mistakes Venture Studios Make Too Early.pdf

How venture studios decide equity splits

The 8-driver framework shared recently sheds light on the variables that influence venture studio deal structures.

But frameworks aren’t enough.

Operators need tools that help them work through real-world constraints, capital limits, founder negotiations, market expectations, and reach specific numbers.

This is where equations matter.

Deal structure isn’t a creative exercise. 

It’s about solving problems with restrictions.

Three forces operate together here:

→ Market constraints: what the ecosystem will tolerate  
→ Studio value: capital, role, and risk the studio assumes  
→ Execution quality: proof that the studio consistently delivers  

Those forces interact, not sequentially but simultaneously.

Studio Equity Range = Market Constraints × Studio Value × Execution Quality

This equation reminds us that no one input can dominate.

You can’t execute your way out of unrealistic follow-on expectations.

You can’t price in studio value without proof of delivery.

No amount of capital justifies a stake founders or investors won’t accept.

To move from theory to action, the model separates into two calculations:

Maximum Studio Equity:

Maximum Studio % = MIN(Follow-On Investor Limit, Industry Norm Max) × Regional Adjustment × Studio Execution Quality

This sets the ceiling based on what downstream capital and ecosystems will accept.

→ Follow-on investors often cap studio ownership to preserve founder equity  
→ Industry norms create soft ceilings around what feels reasonable  
→ Regional culture adjusts tolerance depending on location  
→ Execution quality determines if top-tier outcomes support above-average stakes  

Minimum Studio Equity:

Minimum Studio % = MAX(Investor Return Requirement, Capital Intensity Floor, Role Contribution Floor) × Entrepreneur Competition Penalty × Studio Execution Quality

This sets the floor based on what the studio needs to make the deal viable.

→ Return expectations tie back to fund math, risk, and portfolio strategy  
→ Capital and role contribution set basic ownership needs  
→ Execution quality influences whether those inputs hold weight  
→ In competitive founder markets, studios may be forced to come in lower  

The difference between these two values creates what matters most:

Viable Range:

Viable Range = Minimum Studio % – Maximum Studio %

If the viable range is negative, the deal doesn’t work.

Studios can’t beat the math with storytelling.

But the values inside the formula can be improved.

→ Shift capital strategy to change return requirements  
→ Target follow-on VCs with higher tolerance for studio collaboration  
→ Improve execution quality to raise credibility with both talent and capital  

This isn’t about fixing one number, it’s about making the formula hold.

P.S. Here’s the full breakdown and tools: 
https://lnkd.in/ebjg8Z7C

Your venture studio is missing a voice.pdf

In June 2023, Business Insider reported tensions at the venture studio Fractal, where several founders said they had been “blacklisted” by later-stage investors.

That report set off a chain of closer analysis.

Here’s a case study, grounded in public information, that revealed there deeper design issue:

1) Follow-on Capital: 

Fractal promised founders that their companies could raise a Series A just 12 months after launch. 

That’s nearly 4x faster than the average startup timeline and half the time most venture studios take. 

Investors weren’t open to the companies that clearly were not ready for that stage.

2) Founder Incentives: 

Press reports suggest entrepreneurs held only ~15% equity. 

That made it harder to attract strong founding teams, and triggered concern from later-stage capital about founder incentives.

3) Operational Load: 

Spinning up one company per week with 100 staff reduced support per venture to ~2 full-time equivalents, assuming zero admin and operations overhead.

For an equity stake that was greater than a cofounder stake, the equity studio took didn’t match the operational lift they provided.

4)  Market Misalignment: 

Fractal’s thesis focused on “boring markets with unicorn potential,” but their target VC investors weren’t aligned with that narrative. 

Founders were caught in the middle.

None of these elements would have sunk the model individually.

But venture studios are integrated systems. 

When any one stakeholder group isn’t aligned, founders, investors, or internal teams, the consequences ripple through all of them.

And when alignment fails at multiple levels, the venture studio model breaks.

The Fractal Case Study.pdf

I'll be moderating at the Virtual VC Conf on March 31. Topic: “The Cap Table Problem: Do Venture Studios Make Startups Uninvestable for VCs?”  Join me and register free here:  https://vcconf.com?32

9Point8 Collective's Matt Burris moderates a venture studio panel on the cap table problem

Mais de 18 anos de experiência em venture capital, inovação aberta e empreendedorismo de alto impacto, conectando startups, clientes e investidores. 
Atualmente é investidor anjo e consultor de venture capital na FIEMG (Federação das Indústrias de Minas Gerais), onde lidera a construção do maior hub de inovação industrial da América Latina.
Foi fundador da Endeavor em Minas Gerais, atuou como Head de Corporates no Cubo Itaú, maior hub de inovação da América Latina, e analista do Fundo Novavrvm, primeiro fundo exclusivo de seed capital do Brasil. 
É fundador da Genesis Startups, venture studio que lançou startups como a Me Escuta, Ctrl Saúde e A Ponte. 
Sua trajetória inclui ainda experiências em private equity (Imeri Capital), M&A (Araujo Fontes) e a liderança do Hub Minas Digital, primeiro programa de open innovation feito pelo setor público no Brasil.

Rodolfo Zhouri

Inovar em grandes empresas é, sem dúvida, de longe, a coisa mais difícil que já tentei fazer na minha carreira. Digo tentei porque a verdade é essa: eu tentei. Infelizmente, assumo que fracassei em 100% das vezes.
Seja intraempreendedorismo, open innovation, venture building ou corporate venture capital, todas essas maneiras de “tentar” inovar em grandes empresas nas quais me envolvi fracassaram.
Não digo isso de forma alguma contra qualquer uma dessas iniciativas; pelo contrário, fui, sou e sempre serei um entusiasta delas. 
Mas confesso: as grandes empresas poderiam ajudar, né?
Acabei de ler um estudo da Spectra Investments sobre o cenário de corporate venture capital no Brasil (link nos comentários).
Fiquei triste. O resultado é: péssimo!
“A taxa interna de retorno média dos fundos é de -10%, com mediana de -12% e um top quartil com retorno de 2%. Como resultado, 70% dos programas registram TIR negativa.”
Venture capital já é algo difícil — muito difícil. Agora, corporate venture capital é outro nível de dificuldade. É algo literalmente sofrível, desgastante, complexo, polêmico e, muitas vezes, completamente irracional.
Sou apaixonado por venture capital desde que ouvi falar do termo “capital de risco” pela primeira vez, em 2005, quando trabalhava na UFMG Consultoria Jr., que, à época, era parceira da Jardim Botânico Investimentos.
Se grandes empresas continuarem a tratar #CVC (ou qualquer outra iniciativa de inovação) como um “nice to have” e, diante de qualquer crise, susto ou espirro, decidirem (de forma irracional e sem embasamento) desplugar, desligar ou encerrar essa unidade, com certeza vão amargar prejuízos.
E os culpados NÃO SÃO os profissionais de inovação!
Investir em inovação não é modinha. CVC não é modinha. Você não toma a decisão de fazer CVC em uma grande empresa porque está com excesso de caixa, alta liquidez e taxas de juros baixas. CVC não é estratégia de diversificação de capital. Nunca foi e nunca será. CVC é um comprometimento máximo com o futuro de um negócio.  Você decide fazer CVC se está comprometido(a) a inovar. Inovar de verdade,  que gera resultado. E isso demanda TEMPO!
A todos os amigos e amigas que trabalham com inovação em grandes empresas : vocês têm meu mais profundo RESPEITO e ADMIRAÇÃO. O trabalho de vocês é muito difícil, é ingrato e demanda muito mais do que competência: demanda coragem, perseverança, extrema paciência e muito jogo de cintura.
Meus sinceros e profundos votos de sucesso!

Muito feliz em anunciar o podcast do FIEMG Anjos : Linha de Produção. Vamos entrevistar líderes de áreas de corporate venture capital em indústrias e founders de indtechs para desvendar como se dá o product market fit neste setor.

Vem aí o Linha de Produção, o novo podcast do FIEMG Anjos! 🚀 

No comando, Rodolfo Zhouri recebe quem está na linha de frente da transformação da indústria brasileira: fundadores de indtechs que estão revolucionando processos e líderes de Corporate Venture Capital de 
grandes indústrias.

Um conteúdo feito para quem quer entender de perto como tecnologia, indústria e investimento se conectam para gerar impacto de verdade.

Acompanhe o lançamento e embarque com a gente nessa jornada!

O futuro da indústria está sendo produzido agora e você merece participar dessa evolução.

#Podcast #LinhaDeProdução #FIEMGAnjos #InovaçãoIndustrial #Indtech

Estamos concluíndo o mapeamento de indtechs na Indústria Brasileira, uma iniciativa do FIEMG Anjos , FIEMG Lab e Deloitte. Convido todas as indtechs , indústrias e investidores a participarem respondendo esse breve form :

Open article: Fill | Mapeamento do Mercado de Indtechs na Indústria Brasileira by forms.office.com

Fill | Mapeamento do Mercado de Indtechs na Indústria Brasileira

Indtechs & Capital — Notas de campo (3/3)
Pouco venture capital — e por que os poucos importam
Existe uma escassez estrutural de venture capital direcionado a #indtechs no Brasil.
Isso se explica por fatores conhecidos:
 – ciclos de maturação mais longos
 – dependência de validação operacional
 – métricas menos padronizadas
 – e necessidade de capital mais paciente
Na prática, poucos fundos conseguem operar bem nessa interseção entre indústria e tecnologia.
Alguns exemplos que aparecem de forma recorrente nesse espaço incluem:
- FIEMG Anjos
- RAJA
- Timenow
- DGF
- Indicator Capital
São exceções em um mercado onde grande parte do capital está estruturada para modelos de:
 – crescimento acelerado
 – vendas rápidas
 – e padrões mais próximos de SaaS ou plataformas digitais
O efeito sistêmico é um funil desequilibrado:
 – muitas indtechs tecnicamente qualificadas
 – poucos investidores preparados para o risco específico
 – e processos de captação longos, custosos e incertos
Para o founder de indtech, isso exige mais do que um bom pitch.
 Exige entendimento claro sobre:
 – o próprio modelo real de negócio
 – o ritmo de crescimento possível
 – e o tipo de capital que, de fato, faz sentido
Em indtech, captar investimento é menos sobre volume de investidores disponíveis  e mais sobre aderência entre tese, tempo e capital.

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